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Winning the War Against SelfCensorship: Eliminating Special Verdicts

in Defamation Actions
I. Introduction
Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia entered two Palestinian

refugee camps in West Beirut on September 14, 1982 and slaughtered more than seven hundred Palestinian civilians. The militia entered the camps with the permission of the occupying Israel Defense
Forces, headed by Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon.1 A few
months later, Time magazine entitled its February 21, 1983 issue

"The Verdict is Guilty: An Israeli commission apportions the blame
for the Beirut massacre."12 The article discussed the findings and recommendations of the special commission, which the Israeli government formed to investigate the massacre. The discussion described
the commission's report as a "stinging indictment" of Sharon. The
article contained extensive quotations from the Commission's report,

which asserted that Sharon had neglected his duties as Defense Minister by failing to consider the possibility that innocent civilians

would be murdered when the Phalangist militia were permitted to
enter the Palestinian camps. Additionally, Time reported that the
Commission had recommended Sharon's resignation as Minister of
Defense.
As a result of the article, Sharon brought a libel suit against

Time. Sharon did not contest the overall thrust of the article.3 Instead, he based his claim on the magazine's assertion 4 that Sharon
I. For an account of the events surrounding the massacres, see Sharon v. Time, Inc.,
599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). Many of those killed were women and children. Kaplan,
The Judge's Postmortem of the Sharon Libel Trial, The National Law Journal, March 18,
1985, at 1, col. I. After the tragedy, a special Commission was established by the Israeli
government to inquire into the killings and to determine who was responsible for the massacre.
The Commission's final report recommending Sharon's resignation was issued on February 7,
1983. Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 542.
2. The February 21, 1983, issue of Time appeared on newsstands during the week of
February 14, 1983. See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
3. Id.
4. The one paragraph in the article upon which Sharon based his claim stated:
One section of the report, known as Appendix B, was not published at all,
mainly for security reasons. That section contains the names of several intelligence agents referred to elsewhere in the report. Time has learned that it also
contains further details about Sharon's visit to the Gemayel family on the day

"reportedly discussed" the "need for the Phalangists to take revenge" for the family of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel
on the day after Gemayel's assassination. 5 The case went to a jury6
trial which lasted ten days. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge
submitted the case to the jury by special verdict. Not only did he ask
the jury to decide whether the article was defamatory, whether it
was false, and whether Time acted with actual malice, but he also
had the jury return to the courtroom to announce each part of the
verdict as it was reached.7 The jury first found the article defamatory to the extent that it suggested Sharon "consciously intended"
the massacre. Two days later, the jury announced its finding that the
article was false. A full week later,' 8 the jury announced that Time
had not acted with "actual malice.
As a result of the special verdict procedure, each side boasted
victory. Sharon claimed to have won what he sought - vindication
through public pronouncement that the article was false.9 Time declared that it won the final combat. Even Time, however, recognized
the public perception that "Sharon won two, Time won one." 10 According to Time's Managing Editor, Ray Cave, "It was a very unfortunate position to be in . . . Had there been one verdict, there would
have been one press conference and one public perception.""
Thus, in an analysis of the Sharon trial and the public perceptions which followed, one question emerges in sharp relief: Did the
use of the special verdict undermine the ultimate proclamation that
Time's words were protected by the first amendment? In the final
analysis, the answer must be "yes." Time had to expend considerable
time and money"2 defending a publication that was ultimately deterafter Bashir Gemayel's assassination. Sharon reportedly told the Gemayels that
the Israeli army would be moving into West Beirut and that he expected the
Christian forces to go into the Palestinian refugee camps. Sharon also reportedly
discussed with the Gemayels the need for the Phalangists to take revenge for the
assassination of Bashir, but the details of the conversation are not known.
Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. at 538, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
5. Kaplan, supra note 1.
6. United States District Judge Abraham D. Sofaer.
7. Although the use of special verdicts is not unusual in long trials, legal observers
asserted that the decision to announce each finding as it was reached was unprecedented.
Kaplan, supra note 1.
8. Another significant controversial aspect of the case was that in addition to the use
of a seriatim verdict, the jury was permitted to read a formal statement at the close of its
deliberations criticizing "certain Time employees" for acting "negligently and carelessly in
reporting" the Sharon cover story. "The jury's statement, which immediately followed its ruling on actual malice that ended the case, was a stark departure from courtroom protocol." Id.
9. According to Sharon's attorney, Milton Gould, "We didn't come for money. We
came for vindication." Jost, Taking Revenge on Journalists,L.A. Daily Journal, January 28,
1985, at 2, col. 5.
10. Kaplan, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Time's expenses ran close to $2,000,000 in its defense. Jost, supra note 9.

mined to require Constitutional protection. More importantly, even
Time had to admit that the public perceived Sharon as leaving the
courthouse in victory. 3
This comment will outline when and why special verdicts are
used. It will consider the protection the first amendment affords one
who makes false and injurious statements about another and will analyze how the use of the special verdict in defamation actions deteri-

orates that protection. Furthermore, the comment will explore the
possibility of bolstering the constitutionally required "actual malice"
standard by eliminating the corrosive use of special verdicts in defamation actions.
II.

Special Verdicts Generally

Substantive defamation law is purely a creature of state law.
Nonetheless, because many of these actions are diversity suits
against media defendants, defamation suits are brought in both state
and federal courts. The choice of forum dictates the procedure that
will be followed regarding the use of general14 and special verdicts.' 5
A.

Federal Courts

In the federal courts, the submission of a special verdict to the
jury is a procedural matter governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a). 16 The federal rule is used regardless of any conflicting
state practice.17 Under Rule 49(a), the trial judge may submit spe13.

Time's Editor in Chief, Hedley Donovan, aptly termed its eventual success on the

merits a "diminished victory." Jost, supra note 9.

14. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1399 (rev. 5th ed. 1979), a "general verdict" is one "whereby the jury find either for the plaintiff or for the defendant in general
terms; the ordinary form of a verdict ....

That by which they pronounce generally upon all

or any of the issues, either in favor of the plaintiff or defendant."
15. A "special verdict" is "a statement by the jury of the facts it has found - in
essence, the jury's answers to questions submitted to it; the court determines which party,
based on those answers, is to have judgment." Id.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) provides:
The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a
special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer
or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might properly
be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of
submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most
appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction
concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to
make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact
raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial
by jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires, he demands its
submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court
may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a
finding in accord with the judgement on the special verdict.
17. See Bartak v. Bell-Galyardt Wells, Inc., 629 F.2d 523, 531 (8th Cir. 1980); Lowrey v. Clouse, 348 F.2d 252, 260 (8th Cir. 1965); Thedorf v. Lipsey, 237 F.2d 190, 193 (7th

cial issues to the jury rather than receive a general verdict. The rule
is intended to simplify jury instructions.' 8 In the ordinary case, a
general verdict is a sound instrument of justice. Rule 49(a) is directed at the complex case, in which the issues might confuse the
9

jury.1

The decision to invoke Rule 49(a) and request a special verdict
from the jury is a matter committed to the trial court's discretion.2"
Because the rule is permissive rather than mandatory, the district
court does not have to employ a special verdict even if both sides so
request.21 Appellate review of the allowance of a special verdict is
limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.22 It is not
error for a trial court to refuse to submit a requested special issue as
long as the charge correctly advises the jury of the issues it is to
decide.2 3 The only limitation on the trial court's use of special issues
is that the special issues submitted must adequately determine the
factual issues that are essential to judgment.24 Should any issue be
omitted from the submitted questions, the parties automatically
waive their right to a jury resolution of that issue unless they object
before the jury retires. 5 The trial court can decide any issue of fact
omitted from the special issues, but it cannot resolve factual issues
actually submitted to the jury.2 6 Moreover, the court may submit
questions which are a mixture of law and fact as long as they are
accompanied by adequate instructions regarding the legally applica27

ble standards.

Not only does the trial court have absolute discretion concerning whether to submit the case on special issues, it also has wide
latitude regarding both the form and content of the submitted questions.2 8 When a special verdict is used, the trial court reserves a
large measure of control over the final judgment because the court,
not the jury, enters judgment based on the specific findings of fact
Cir. 1956).
18. See Lawrence v. Gulf Oil Corp., 375 F.2d 427, 429 (3d Cir. 1967).
19. Flusk v. Erie R. R. Co., 110 F. Supp. 118, 122 n.l (D.N.J. 1953).
20. See Lowrey v. Clouse, 348 F.2d 252, 260 (8th Cir. 1965).
21. See Garwood v. International Paper Co., 666 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1982). See
also New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Anderson, 293 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1961) (a party may
not demand a special verdict as of right).
22. See New Orleans & N.E.R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 293 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1961).
23. See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Griffith, 265 F.2d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1959); Marcus
Loew Booking Agency v. Princess Pat, Ltd., 141 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1944).
24. See Kornicki v. Calman S.S. Corp., 460 F.2d 1134, 1139 (3d Cir. 1972).
25. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a). For the text of the Rule, see supra note 16.
26. See Guidry v. Kem Mfg. Co., 604 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 929 (1980).
27. See McDonnell v. Timmerman, 269 F.2d 54, 58 (8th Cir. 1959).
28. See Erwin v. Keck, 351 F.2d 403, 406 (6th Cir. 1965); Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co.,
327 F.2d 113, 119 (4th Cir. 1964).

reached by the jury.29
B. State Courts
Many of the states have adopted a rule of civil procedure governing the use of special verdicts that is virtually identical to Rule
49(a). 30 As in the federal courts, state courts use special verdicts in
actions involving numerous and complex issues.3 1 Special verdicts are
also appropriate for cases in which a general verdict would be uncertain. For example, in Olivia v. Dover Drag Strip Realty Corp.,"2 the
operator of a race track could have been held negligent on one of
two theories of liability. The court found that, under the circumstances, a special verdict was appropriate. If a general verdict were
returned in the plaintiff's favor, and, on review, the appellate court
decided that the verdict could be supported by only one of the two
theories, the verdict could not stand. The reviewing court would have
no way of knowing upon which theory the jury based its decision.
In addition to those states that have adopted a rule mirroring
Rule 49(a), many jurisdictions have special verdict procedures that
derive from either statutory or common law or both. 33 Some jurisdictions give the jury discretion to return either a special or a general
verdict in a civil action. For example, under Tennessee common law,
the jury has the right to decide all factual issues, render a general
verdict on the whole case and decline to render a special verdict as
long as they have received proper instruction from the trial court.3 4
Under Florida common law, the trial court may recommend the use
of a special verdict, but the jury is free to disregard the recommendation." Some jurisdictions limit the jury's discretionary use of special verdicts to actions for recovery of money or specific property.3 6
In jurisdictions that delegate to the court, rather than the jury,
the decision whether to use a special verdict, the court often acts
29. See Ratigan v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 291 F.2d 548, 555 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 891 (1961).
30. See, e.g., VT. R. Civ. P. 49(b); MINN. R. Civ. P. 49; ALA. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
31. See, e.g., Crescent Stave Co. v. Brown, 181 Ky. 787, 205 S.W. 937, 939 (1918).
32. 38 A.D.2d 975, 331 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1972).
33. At least one state has abolished completely the use of special verdicts. See OHIO R.
Civ. P. 49(c).
34. See Harbison v. Briggs Bros. Paint, 209 Tenn. 534, 354 S.W.2d 464, 469 (1962).
35. See Lincoln Tower Corp. v. Dunhall's-Florida, Inc., 61 So.2d 474, 475 (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1962).
36. For example, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) provides: "In every
action for the recovery of money only or specific property the jury in their discretion may
render a general or special verdict. In all other cases the court may direct the jury to find a
special verdict in writing upon any or all of the issues." It should also be noted that pursuant
to the South Carolina statute, the court is not bound to direct a special verdict, but if it does
so, the jury must follow the court's direction and render a special, rather than general, verdict.
See Floyd v. New York Life Ins., 110 S.C. 384, 96 S.E. 912, 913-14 (1918).

upon the motion of one of the parties. In Wisconsin, the court is not
required to direct the jury to use a special verdict unless it is requested to do so.37 Once a request is properly made, however, the

court must direct the use of a special verdict.3 8 Under a Georgia
statute, 39 the court, once receiving a motion, has the discretion to

require the jury to return a special verdict. In certain categories of
cases,'" however, once a party makes a written request for a special
verdict, the court must direct its use. Many jurisdictions give the
court authority to exercise its discretion regarding special verdicts
without a motion from the parties."' In some of these states, the use
of the special verdict is the rule; the general verdict is the exception. "'2 In states where the court decides whether to use the special
verdict, the framing of the issues is also left to the court's
43
discretion.
Once the jury has reached a decision on the special verdict, it
will usually return the verdict in writing." After the return, the
clerk often enters the verdict on the court's minutes,' 5 or the verdict
is read aloud in open court.' 6
III.
A.

Defamation and the First Amendment
Historical Development of the "Actual Malice" Standard

In March of 1960, an advertisement appeared in the New York
Times which inaccurately characterized police response to black civil
rights demonstrations in Montgomery, Alabama. The police commissioner of Montgomery, L.B. Sullivan, brought a libel suit against the
paper, claiming that the erroneous allegations reflected unfavorably
upon him in his official capacity. 47 Although Sullivan made no claim
37. See Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344, 352, 10 N.W. 501, 503 (1881).
38. See Honore v. Ludwig, 211 Wis. 354, 247 N.W. 335, 336 (1933); Pearson v. Kelly,
122 Wis. 660, 100 N.W. 1064, 1065 (1904).
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-149 (1982).
40. Id. The code affords a right to special verdict, upon request, in cases involving
equitable relief, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, declaratory judgment, or other cases
where special verdicts are specifically required by law.
41. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 625 (West 1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4111 (Consol.
1978); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 805.12 (West 1983); Johnson v. Artkraft Strauss Sign Corp., 45
A.D.2d 482, 483, 359 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (1974).
42. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 805.12 (West 1983) (unless it orders otherwise, the court
shall direct the jury to return a special verdict); see also 3 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 15.02.1 (1970).
43. Wirsing v. Krzeminski, 61 Wis.2d 513, 523, 213 N.W.2d 37, 42 (1974).
44. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 805.12 (West 1983).
45. Id.
46. MCDONALD, supra note 42, at § 15.02.1.
47. On March 29, 1960, a full-page advertisement appeared in the New York Times
entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices." The ad stated that southern black students engaged in
widespread non-violent demonstrations were being met with a "wave of terror." In its third
paragraph, the authors of the ad alleged that students had been expelled from school, and that

of actual pecuniary loss, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed a
jury award of $500,000 in his favor.4 8
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court in New York

Times v. Sullivan"9 declared unconstitutional an Alabama law by
which general damages were presumed and punitive damages were

available once the plaintiff established libel per se. Under the Alabama law, unless the defendant could prove the truth of his allegations, his good motives or mere belief in the truth of his statements
were relevant only to the mitigation of punitive damages, at the
jury's discretion. 50
The Supreme Court held that the guarantees of the first amend-

ment dictate that a public official cannot recover damages for a defamatory falsehood regarding his official conduct unless he proves
the statement was made with "actual malice." The Court defined
"actual malice" as knowledge that the statement was false, or reckless disregard for the possibility that it was false. 51
Two years later in Curtiss Publishing Co. v. Butts,52 a plurality

of the Court extended the actual malice requirement to cases involving "public figures," in addition to public officials. The Curtiss Court

held that public figures may only recover damages in a defamation
action upon a showing of highly unreasonable conduct which is an
extreme departure from the ordinary standards of investigation and
the Alabama State College campus had been ringed with truckloads of police armed with
shotguns and teargas, in reaction to students singing "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" on the state
capitol steps in Montgomery, Alabama. The authors went on to say that when the student
body protested these actions by refusing to register, the dining hall was padlocked to "starve
them into submission." The sixth paragraph of the ad focused on alleged persecution of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., stating that Dr. King's peaceful protests had been answered with
intimidation and violence. The ad stated that Dr. King's home had been bombed, nearly killing
his wife and child. It added that King had been arrested seven times and assaulted, and that
he was currently charged with perjury.
In reality, black students had gathered on the capitol steps and had sung the national
anthem. Although nine students had been expelled, the expulsion was the result of their demands for lunch counter service at the Montgomery courthouse on a different day. Students
had not protested the expulsion by refusing to register but by cutting classes on a single day.
In fact, virtually all of the students did register. The dining hall was never padlocked. Rather,
service was refused to students who failed to sign preregistration applications or request temporary meal tickets. The police had never surrounded the campus. They had been called to the
campus three times, but not in connection with the singing incident at the Capitol. Dr. King
had been arrested four, rather than seven, times. His alleged assault was hotly disputed. The
police had tried to apprehend and arrest those responsible for bombing Dr. King's home.
In response to the advertisement, L.B. Sullivan, Commissioner of Montgomery's police
department, brought a libel action against the New York Times. The suit was also directed at
some of the sixty-four individuals whose names appeared at the bottom of the text. Many of
these individuals were widely known for their participation in public affairs, religion, trade
unions and the performing arts. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-59
(1964).
48. Id. at 256, 260.
49. Id. at 267.
50. Id. at 254.
51. Id. at 279-80.
52. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

reporting embraced by a responsible publisher."
In 1968, the Court defined the term "reckless disregard," which
it had used in New York Times. The Court held in St. Amant v.
Thompson54 that the reckless disregard aspect of actual malice is not
measured by whether a reasonably prudent publisher would have
published or investigated before publishing. 5 Instead, a showing of
reckless disregard must be based on evidence that the defendant "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.""
When first confronted with the question of whether the actual
malice standard should be applied in a libel action brought by a private plaintiff against a media defendant for defamatory statements
made during a radio broadcast, the Supreme Court looked to
whether or not the statements involved an event of "public or general
interest." In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,57 Rosenbloom, a distributor of adult magazines, brought suit after a radio station broadcast a report that obscene materials had been confiscated in his
home. After the confiscation, Rosenbloom had been acquitted of obscenity charges. A plurality of the Court concluded that because police enforcement of obscenity laws was a matter of "public interest,"
the actual malice standard applied."
The Rosenbloom application of the actual malice standard to
suits by private individuals regarding matters of public interest was
overruled when the issue resurfaced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc."
In that case,6 0 the Court decided that the state's interest in protect53. Id. at 155.
54. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
55. Id. at 731. St. Amant, a candidate for public office, made a defamatory statement
against Thompson, a deputy sheriff, during a television special in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. In
affirming a $5,000 damage award to St. Amant, the Louisiana Supreme Court based its finding of actual malice on the fact that St. Amant had no personal knowledge of Thompson's
activities and failed to verify the accusations before repeating them publicly. Id. at 728-30.
56. Id. at 731.
57. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
58. Id. at 52.
59. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
60. Gertz brought suit against Robert Welch, Inc., the publisher of American Opinion,
the monthly magazine of the John Birch Society. After a Chicago policeman, Nuccio, was
convicted of the murder of a black youth, Nelson, the defendant published an article alleging
that the trial testimony against Nuccio was false and the prosecution was part of a Communist
plot against the police. Although Gertz, an attorney retained by the Nelson family to represent
them in civil litigation against Nuccio, played no part in the criminal trial, the article portrayed him as the mastermind of the "frame-up." The article implied that Gertz had a criminal record and stated that Gertz had once been an official of the Marxist League of Industrial
Democracy. It also alleged that he had been an officer of the National Lawyer's Guild, which
was described as a "Communist" organization which had organized the Chicago demonstrations in 1968.
In actuality, Gertz did not have a criminal record. He was not a "Leninist" or "Communist-fronter." He had never been a member of the Marxist League for Industrial Democracy.
Although he had been an officer of the National Lawyer's Guild, he had taken no part in the
Chicago demonstrations. Although the editor wrote a preface to the article stating the author
had done extensive research into the Nuccio case, the editor did not attempt to verify the

ing the private individual against defamation outweighs the countervailing first amendment rights of the press. The Court reasoned that
because private individuals have less access to the media than do
public officials or figures, they have less opportunity to deny false
accusations. Also, private individuals, in contrast to public officials or
figures, do not voluntarily place themselves in the public eye. 6 1 The
Court found the "events of public interest" test inadequate to safeguard the state's interest in protecting individuals from injury to reputation. As a result, the Court concluded that "so long as they do

not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. ' e
Nonetheless, because the states lack a substantial interest in awarding gratuitous money damages to plaintiffs in excess of actual injury,
the state may not permit the recovery of presumed damages unless
liability is based on the actual malice standard."'
Recently, in Dun and Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,64
a plurality of the Court decided that the Gertz prohibition against
presumed and punitive damages absent actual malice is inapplicable
to actions against non-media defendants when a matter of public
concern is not involved. Due to the reduced constitutional value of
speech regarding matters of purely private concern, the state interest

in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation is sufficient to support presumed and punitive damages without a showing
of actual malice.
Thus, the first amendment guarantee of free speech precludes

recovery for defamatory falsehood in all suits by public officials or
public figures unless actual malice is proved. Moreover, in an action
brought by a private individual against a media defendant, states
may not award either presumed or punitive damages absent actual
malice. Consequently, only in those suits initiated by private plaincharges against Gertz. In his action against Robert Welch, Inc., Gertz alleged no special damages, but since the statements were deemed libel per se, the jury awarded him $50,000. The
court later entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It found New York Times controlling and actual malice lacking, although the Seventh Circuit doubted the district court's finding that Gertz was not a public figure, citing the Supreme Court's intervening decision in
Rosenbloom. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325-32.
61. Id. at 345.
62. Id. at 347.
63. Id. at 349.
64. 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985). Dun and Bradstreet sent a credit report to five subscribers
indicating that Greenmoss had filed for bankruptcy. Not only was the report false, it grossly
misrepresented Greenmoss' assets and liabilities. Although Dun and Bradstreet issued a correction, Greenmoss was still dissatisfied and brought suit in Vermont state court. Believing the
actual malice standard applicable, the trial court granted a new trial after the jury awarded
Greenmoss both presumed and punitive damages. The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding Gertz inapplicable to suits involving non-media defendants.

tiffs against private defendants, involving matters of private concern,
does the actual malice standard disappear.
B.

Goals of the Standard

When the Court first fashioned the actual malice standard, it
sought to further the purposes of the first amendment not only by

encouraging vigorous public debate,65 but also by discouraging media self-censorship. 66 The Court perceived the issue in New York
Times as whether media participation in public debate loses some of
its constitutional protection because of the falsity of defamatory factual statements.
The Court focused on whether requiring a critic of the govern-

ment to guarantee the accuracy of all its factual assertions would
lead to undesirable self-censorship. According to the Court, the protection of free speech does not turn upon the "truth, popularity, or
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered"

inevitable. 68

67

because

some degree of falsity is
Relying on Madison's assertion
that "some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of
everything; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the
65. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375-76 (1927)):
Those who won our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American
government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate
menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law - the argument
of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing
majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly
should be guaranteed.
66. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279. Opining that the first amendment was designed
to "assure unfettered interchange of ideas" and recognizing that it is a valuable privilege of
the United States' citizen to "speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste,
on all public institutions," the Court asserted the existence of a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." Id. at 269-70.
67. Id. at 271 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)).
68. The Court had previously acknowledged in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940), that falsity is inevitable:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to
his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we
know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or
are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of
this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability
of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
Id. at 310.

press," 6 9 the Court concluded that erroneous statements must be

protected in order to provide freedom of expression the "breathing
space" it needs to survive. 7°
The Court approved the holding in Sweeny v. Patterson,7 1 in
which the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out
that "[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is taken from the field
of free debate."'7 2 Thus, the first amendment shield cannot be low-

ered simply because the critic has made factual errors.73 A defense
of erroneous statements honestly made is essential to guard against
self-censorship. 7 The Court opined that a defense of truth is inadequate to achieve this goal. A defense of truth does not guard against
self-censorship because it does not mean that only false speech will
be deterred. Critics who believe in the truth of their averments
might be deterred from making them out of fear that the averments
cannot be proved in court or because the expense of establishing
truth may be prohibitive. This is especially unfortunate because
many of these averments are, in fact, true. 5
Additionally, the Court intimated that permitting the critic of
public affairs to make false statements might even have some desirable consequences. In a footnote, the Court pointed out that "[elven a
false statement may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to
public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.' ",76 This
does not sanction the proliferation of lies. The Court simply articulated its belief that the danger of false communication is outweighed
by the danger of restricting a vigorous press.7
69.

New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271 (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 571 (1876)).

70. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272.
71.

128 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942). In Sweeny,

Judge Edgerton spoke for a unanimous court in affirming the dismissal of a Congressman's
libel suit based on a newspaper article that charged him with anti-Semitism:
Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the political conduct of
officials reflect the obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their
governors . . . The interest of the public here outweighs the interest of appellant
or any other individual. The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but information. Political conduct and views which some respectable people
approve, and other condemn, are constantly imputed to Congressmen. Errors of
fact, particularly in regard to a man's mental states and processes are inevitable
• . . whatever is added to the field of libel is to be taken from the field of free
debate.
Id. at 458.
72. Sweeny v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
678 (1942).
73. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 272-73.
74. Id. at 278-79.
75. Id. at 279.
76. Id. at 279 n.19 (quoting J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 25 (1947)). See also J. MILTON,
AREOPAGRITICA, IN PROSE WORK 561 (1959).
77. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968).

The Court reaffirmed this position in Gertz and acknowledged
that although the actual malice standard exacts a high price from
defamation victims, it is an "extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media self-censorship. '78 In Gertz, the Court also concluded that permitting presumed or punitive damages would increase
the likelihood of self-censorship without compensating the individual
for any actual loss sustained.79
Thus, the Supreme Court has firmly established in New York
Times and subsequent decisions that the actual malice standard was
formulated to ensure free public debate without self-censorship. In
essence, the Supreme Court has determined that in order for the first
amendment protection of free speech to be given any meaningful
construction, the critic of public officials or figures must be allowed
to disseminate information even though it may be false.80 Even in
suits by defamed private individuals, the interest in deterring selfcensorship is of such magnitude that the media defendant who has
not acted with actual malice need only compensate the plaintiff for
actual pecuniary loss.
IV. The Use of Special Verdicts Undermines the Actual Malice
Standard
A.

The Danger of Self-Censorship

Through use of a three-part special verdict, the jury declares
(1) whether the statements were defamatory, that is, damaging to
the plaintiff's reputation, (2) whether the statements were false and
(3) whether the defendant acted with actual malice. This permits the
jury to declare that the plaintiff was falsely defamed even though the
defendant was without the requisite constitutional fault - actual
malice. In the Sharon case, the fragmented jury verdict was enough
for Sharon to proclaim victory. His attorney, Milton S. Gould, declared that "[w]e won everything but the cherry on the cake." 8' Because many plaintiffs bring defamation actions to punish the media8"
and restore their reputations,83 at least one commentator has sug78. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
79. Id. at 349-50.
80. For further exploration of the premise that the Court intended to free the press
from self-censorship of even unsubstantiated statements, see Anderson, Libel and Press SelfCensorship, 53 TEx. L. REv. 422 (1975).
81. Wise, Time Not Guilty of Malice in False Report on Sharon, 193 THE NEW
YORK LAW JOURNAL, January 25, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
82. Ariel Sharon stated, "Time's allegations were false. We hope it [the verdict] will
prevent Time magazine from libeling in the future." Id.
83. R. Bezanon, G. Cranberg & J. Soloski, Libel and the Press: Setting the Record
Straight, The 1985 Silha Lecture at University of Minnesota (May 15, 1985) (unpublished
manuscript available from the Silha Center for the study of Media, Ethics and Law, School of
Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Minnesota, Ill Murphy Hall, 206

gested that plaintiffs, particularly public officials, be allowed to request a special verdict in order to clear their names, even though
they cannot prove actual malice. "
Individuals, whether public or private, 85 have a legitimate inter-

est in clearing their reputations, but they should not be permitted to
do so by employing the special verdict. By doing so, they effectively
circumvent the constitutional protection afforded by the actual malice standard. That important standard was created to prevent the
kind of media self-censorship that undermines first amendment
guarantees.
As pointed out by Justice Brennan in his Gertz dissent, many
forces operate to control the press. For example, "traditions, attitudes, and general rules of political conduct are . . . important con-

trols." 8 In addition, the "fear of opening a credibility gap, and
thereby

check.

' 87

lessening one's influence,

holds some participants

in

Thus, once an "impartial tribunal" has determined that a

media defendant has published a defamatory falsehood, the decision

could have a chilling effect on members of the media trying to protect their reputation for accuracy and credibility.
Even more important, however, is the fear that self-censorship
might increase if special verdicts become commonplace in defamation suits. An increase in the availability of special verdicts would

certainly encourage plaintiffs to bring suits for vindication, despite
their inability to establish that the defendant acted with actual malice. According to a study of libel actions conducted at the University
of Iowa under the auspices of the School of Journalism and Mass
Communications and the College of the Law, only one-fourth of all
defamation plaintiffs bring suit with an eye toward recovering money
damages. 88 In fact, the majority of plaintiffs studied stated they
brought suit in order to punish the media and restore their reputa-

tions. 89 According to the study, most libel plaintiffs suffer no finanChurch Street, S.E., Minneapolis, Minn., 55455-0418).
84. See Freund, Remarks to Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit, 42 F.R.D. 437,
497 (1966).
85. References to defamation actions brought by "private persons" will hereafter mean
those actions in which the actual malice standard is applicable under Gertz.
86. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 365 n.2 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 538 (1970)).
87. Id.
88. R. Bezanon, G. Cranberg & J. Soloski, supra note 83.
89. This theme has been repeatedly recognized. Justice Thurgood Marshall once observed that "many self-perceived victims of defamation are animated by something more than
a rational calculus of their chances of recovery." Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 204 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel
Law and a Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 6 (1983). Similarly, the founder of the Church of
Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, who has been described as "litigous," has commented that "it is
destructive word of mouth to permit the public presses to express their biased and badly reported sensationalism. Therefore, we should be very alert to sue for slander at the slightest

cial loss as a result of the alleged libel and claim only emotional
suffering. Money damages do not compensate the plaintiff; he feels
compensated by setting the record straight. One plaintiff described

his motives as follows: "It would be childish of me to deny that I am
delighted to have won a monetary victory. Of course I am. But I did

not enter into combat with the defendant as a monetary investment.
The six-year fight against their destructive conspiracy has been
crowned with victory."9 Plaintiffs often see the mere act of initiat-

ing suit as an effective response. 91 Ninety-percent of all libel plaintiffs eventually lose their suits,92 largely because they cannot satisfy
the actual malice standard. 93
The danger of permitting the special verdict to flourish in an
area in which the primary goal of the plaintiff is vindication rather
than compensation is that the fragmented special verdict encourages
individuals who cannot surmount the constitutional wall of actual
malice to bring their claims for vindication alone. Like Sharon, the

plaintiff can become a two-out-of-three "winner." Moreover, the potential that plaintiffs will bring vindication lawsuits is increased by

the fact that so many plaintiffs can sue cheaply on a contingent fee
basis. 94 A vindication suit is essentially a suit for non-monetary relief. In suits for non-monetary relief, any state interest in compensating the plaintiff is highly speculative at best. Yet the danger of selfcensorship is quite real. 95 Because the cost of defending a defama-

tion action is overwhelming, more lawsuits will inevitably result in
increased self-censorship.
The cost of defending a full-fledged defamation action begins at
about $20,000.96 The defense in Rosenbloom reportedly cost
chance so as to discourage the public presses from mentioning Scientology." Shaffer, Church
of Scientology Attacks Investigators and Critics, Washington Post, August 16, 1978, at A4,
col. 3 (quoting Mr. Hubbard).
90. Anderson, supra note 80, at 435 n.65 (quoting J. FAULK, FEAR ON TRIAL 397
(1964)).
91. R. Bezanson, G. Cranberg & J. Soloski, supra note 83, at 26.
92. Id. at 5.
93. According to statistics compiled by Franklin, supra note 89, at 5, jurors rule
against media defendants eighty-five percent (85%) of the time. Trial judges enter judgments
notwithstanding the verdict in twenty percent (20%) of these cases. Defendants appeal from
virtually all adverse judgments. Because the plaintiff loses his judgment on appeal two-thirds
of the time, only five to ten percent (5-10%) of plaintiffs suing media defendants ultimately
keep their judgments.
94. Nearly eighty percent (80%) of libel plaintiffs engage lawyers on a contingent basis
and virtually all public officials sue on contingency. Few pay any costs or fees unless they win
in court, which is rare. See, R. Bezanson, G. Cranberg & J. Soloski, supra note 83, at 25. The
fact that lawyers presently take such lawsuits, with little likelihood of success, on a contingent
basis negates any inference that they would not continue to do so as more cases are brought
merely for purposes of vindication.
95. Anderson, supra note 80, at 479.
96. Note, Constitutional Law-Self-Censorship after Herbert v. Lando: The Need for
Pre-TrialProcedure in Defamation Actions, 58 N.C. L. REV. 1025, 1034 n.5 (1980).
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In a case that settled after four months of trial, ABC
spent $7,000,000 in legal fees. Time spent $2,000,000 defending a
libel action that was dismissed before trial. 9" The legal expenses in
Sharon were an estimated $3,000,000."0 Courts have taken notice of
the threat to the first amendment imposed by litigation costs. The
Fifth Circuit recognized that "a libel suit might necessitate long and
expensive trial proceedings, which, if not really warranted, [would
have a] chilling effect." 100 According to one commentator, 10 1 the media dread being sued because of the potential cost of winning in addition to the cost of potential damages if they lose.
The resulting tendency of the media to avoid controversial topics is most pronounced in newspaper journalism. Newspapers lack
incentive to take risks on controversial subject matter that might
give rise to a lawsuit because they have virtually no competition.
Moreover, there is plenty of news to publish without taking risks.
Thus, newspapers in particular can easily reduce the risk of suit
when they select content. 02 The editor of Nation once stated that on
occasion he has "arranged for authors to testify before Congressional
Committees to get stories before the public simply because a publication such as the Nation cannot afford the luxury of winning a libel
action."' 03
Self-censorship resulting from the threat of litigation expenses 0 4 is especially prevalent among small publishers. For example, More magazine, a small opinion journal, reported that it edited
05
out much controversial material because it feared litigation costs.
More's attorney advised that should a lawsuit arise, it would probably prevail on the merits. Defending a suit, however, would bankrupt
More. Often, plaintiffs can obtain considerable settlements simply
because it is cheaper to pay a settlement than to defend. 06
The journalist's sense of professional responsibility is inadequate
to combat economic pressures. Because the press cannot be relied on
to give priority to the abstract principle of free speech over economic
self-interest, economic pressure must be reduced to maximize free
$100,000.

97. Id.
98. Franklin, supra note 89, at 13-14.
99. Just, supra note 9.
100. Anderson, supra note 80, at 435-36 (quoting Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565,
566 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969)).
101. Franklin, supra note 89, at 14.
102. Id. at 14-15.
103. Anderson, supra note 80, at 436 n.2 (quoting McWilliams, Is Muckraking Coming
Back?, 9 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 8, 15 (1970)).
104. For a discussion of why libel insurance is ineffective in reducing self-censorship due
to litigation costs, see Franklin, supra note 89, at 18, 21.
105. Note, supra note 96, at 1034-35.
106. Anderson, supra note 80, at 435.

discussion.10 7
As indicated, self-censorship does not result solely from the
threat of monetary damages. A suit for nominal damages or declaratory judgment would involve the full panoply of defamation issues,
except those relating to damages, and the substantial costs of defending would be the same. 10 8 This is a significant consideration for
the plaintiff who seeks only vindication. The special verdict permits
him to do so, at a substantial cost to the defendant, even though he
cannot meet the constitutional burden of proving actual malice.
Some commentators have argued that the actual malice standard falls short of preventing self-censorship because it does not reduce litigation costs. 10 9 If this is true, permitting vindication through
special verdicts merely increases the shortcoming of the actual malice standard. Although the actual malice standard may not have
been intended to free the press entirely from the libel threat, it was
expected to reduce that threat. In fact, some "assumed" libel suits
would be extinct in the wake of New York Times and its progeny." 0
Nonetheless, the actual malice standard is undermined by permitting
special verdicts, which encourage more would-be plaintiffs to seek
vindication in the courtroom.
Some might argue that special verdicts simply discourage
shoddy journalism. But when the media shy away from important,
controversial stories because they fear a defamation suit, even one
which they would eventually win, the public loses information necessary to proper self-government. The public also misses the opportunity to learn about nongovernmental conduct that greatly affects entire communities."'
Thus, in determining whether special verdicts are appropriate in
defamation cases, the courts engage in a balancing process. The desirability of allowing plaintiffs to vindicate themselves through a special finding that a story is false must be weighed against the danger
of encouraging suits by plaintiffs who cannot prove actual malice. A
proliferation of suits will certainly increase self-censorship among
media that are afraid to risk expensive lawsuits." 2
107. Id. at 434.
108. Id. at 479.
109. Id. at 424-25.
110. Id. at 430.
Ill. Franklin, supra note 89, at 30.
112. In this balancing process, it is important to note that the actual malice standard is
no mere legal technicality. According to Henry R. Kaufman, general counsel of the Libel
Defense Resource Center, the actual malice standard serves an essential purpose:
[The rule] recognizes that the press cannot guarantee the truth of every newsworthy statement it publishes. Error is inevitable in free debate. When the issues
are war and peace, I for one would rather have more information, with all of its
uncertainties, than only the official version of events or those items the press can

B.

Courts Versus Self-Help

When a plaintiff like Ariel Sharon declares victory through vindication in spite of his inability to jump the actual malice hurdle, a
serious question arises whether courtrooms are proper fora for the
pursuit of vindication without compensation. There are several reasons why this question should be answered in the negative.
1. Alternative channels of effective communication.-Selfhelp is available to clear the individual's name without resorting to
the courtroom. In fact, it was precisely because of the ability to respond to false allegations that the Court in Gertz justified applying
the actual malice standard to defamation suits by public figures,
even when the public figures have suffered actual injury. According
to the Court,
[t]he first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the
error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation.
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly
greater access to the channels of effective communication and,
hence, have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy. Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater. 13
Because of this ability to correct false statements, a public figure
plaintiff should not be permitted to bring suit in already crowded
courtrooms and request a special verdict so that he can receive fur1
ther vindication. 1
Moreover, the private individual is gaining increased access to
"channels of effective communication" through the adoption of
right-of-reply and retraction statutes. Some states will not permit a
libel action against a media defendant unless the plaintiff has first
requested a retraction or correction and that request has been denied.11 5 Many states have made a legislative determination that general or punitive damages cannot be recovered unless the plaintiff has
guarantee to be without error. There is no such guarantee, nor does the First
Amendment demand it.
Kaufman, Sharon Didn't Win, L.A. Daily Journal, January 31, 1985, at 4, col. 4.
113. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
114. "The Supreme Court, in noting that public officials and public figures have greater
access to the media of communication to answer false accusations than do private persons, has
indicated that, at least in the realm of public affairs, it views replies as preferable to lawsuits."
F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 48 (1981).
115. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 95-1-5 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.05 (West
1983).

requested and been denied a retraction." 6 Other states have given
individuals the right to demand a retraction or correction. In that
event, the truth will be broadcast or published without cost to the
17
individual.
With the evolution of right-of-reply and retraction statutes,
some believe that private individuals, too, should seek to clear their
names outside the courtroom. 1 8 Dependence on the courts "to set
the public's thinking straight about a person's reputation" is clearly
inconsistent with reliance on the free marketplace of ideas to
counteract "fallacious political or religious propositions.""' 9 The
search for political and religious "truths" does not require the courts
to guide the individual's assessment. Instead, the individual's access
to competing ideas enables him to perceive the truth for himself.
Thus, because public officials and public figures presumably have access to "channels of effective communication," and because many
states are providing private individuals with a reply or retraction
route as well, courts should give greater deference to the idea that
free debate will allow the individual to ascertain the truth outside
the court system. One commentator has suggested that a verbal response to defamation will suffice as a remedy if the public is taught
to respond to personal attacks upon individuals with "skepticism and
suspended judgment." 20
2. The Constitutional inadequacy of courts.-The Supreme
Court has made it clear that not all false statements should be penalized or suppressed.' 2 In New York Times, the Court established
that the first amendment guarantees the right to criticize, and to
defame, public officials. That right was extended to the critic of public figures in Curtiss Publishing. In Gertz, the Court stated that the
communications media are entitled to act under the assumption that
all public figures and officials have exposed themselves voluntarily to
the risk of defamation. 22 Certainly, the right to criticize those in the
See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-818 through 27-1-821 (1983); NEB. REV.
25-840.01 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1446(a) (West 1980); OR. REV. STAT. §
30.160 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-11-7 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-24-103
(1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-1 (1981).
117. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1447.5 (West 1980)
116.
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118. For a discussion advocating the replacement of general damages with right of reply
and retraction statutes, see Comment, An Alternative to the General-Damage Award for Defamation, 20 STAN. L. REV. 504 (1968).
119. F. HAIMAN, supra note 114, at 49.
120. Id.
121. Certainly not all false statements should be penalized through libel laws. All the
members of the Supreme Court agree that at least regarding defamation of public individuals,
the Constitution protects the right to publish what is false unless the publication is done with
actual malice. See T. EMERSON. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESS 531 (1970).
122. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).

limelight would be greatly restricted if the critic were forced to establish before a jury the truth of his statements.123 In essence, the
use of the special verdict is just as destructive a restriction. It diminishes the right to criticize by having the jury speak first to the falsity
of the defendant's statements, even though the plaintiff has failed to
meet the actual malice burden. Thus, it allows plaintiffs like Sharon
not only to feel, but to declare publicly, victory through vindication.
The scope of constitutional protection afforded false accusers
among the media is broad, especially when a special verdict is not
employed to highlight the falsity. The establishment of the actual
malice standard to prevent self-censorship by the media reflects a
determination by the Supreme Court that speech must be overprotected lest it be underprotected.1 1 Even though some might argue
that charges which cannot be proved true to the satisfaction of an
impartial tribunal are better left unreported, the actual malice standard was developed on the firm conviction that suspicions of wrongdoing in the realm of public affairs should be aired rather than inhibited. They should be brought out into the open and rejected only
if conflicting evidence in the marketplace of ideas warrants that
125
conclusion.
In advocating the abolition of punitive damages in all defamation cases, some commentators have noted that the only function of
punitive damages is deterrence. Deterrence of any speech because of
its content is inconsistent with the commitment to freedom of expression embodied in the first amendment, "no matter how offensive,
useless, false or destructive" the speech is.126 The same can be said
about deterrence of speech through the use of the special verdict. It
is not enough to claim that journalists should be more responsible
and that irresponsible journalism may be deterred by the costs of
litigation and the exposure of inaccurate reporting. By implementing
the actual malice standard, the Supreme Court has determined that
the courtroom should not be used to deter speech and promote selfcensorship.
3. The irrelevance of truth.-Special verdicts should not be
used for vindication because certification that the defendant has reported falsely, when the plaintiff cannot meet its constitutional burden, is not the function of the courts. In Gertz, the Court objected to
the use of presumed and punitive damages that were unrelated to the
123. For the proposition that the actual malice standard is the minimum degree of protection needed to protect the right to criticize, see T. EMERSON, supra note 121, at 532.
124. See Kaplan, supra note I, at 103-04.
125. See HAIMAN, supra note 114, at 52-53.
126. Anderson, supra note 80, at 477.

state's legitimate interest in compensating the individual for actual
pecuniary loss resulting from injury to reputation.127 Similarly, permitting a certification of falsity might allow the plaintiff to feel vindicated, but the use of special verdicts for such a purpose cannot be
justified by the state's interest in compensating for actual loss.
Even in cases involving private individuals as plaintiffs, the actual malice standard must stand between the plaintiff and his receipt
of compensation for anything other than special damages. The legitimacy of a state's interest in establishing truth, clearing the plaintiff's
name, or exposing falsity is questionable. There is a time-honored
belief that the truth is best discovered through free discussion as opposed to state intervention. This belief is offended by the notion that
courts
are designated "to 6ertify truth rather than compensate for
' ' zs
loss. 1

It is true that at their earliest inception, defamation suits were
designed to achieve vindication. At that time, however, the only
available remedy was a public apology outside the courtroom.' 29 The
modern day equivalent of that public apology is found in state retraction statutes. It was not until the advent of money damages that
defamation actions moved inside the courtroom. 3 ° This historical development illustrates that the courtroom is not the proper forum for
defamation suits unless the plaintiff seeks recompense for actual pecuniary loss.
The public might be more inclined to believe a judicial determination that accusations are false rather than an individual's reply. In
a democratic society, however, citizens do not look to their government to designate truth. Instead, they must learn to assess the credibility of spokesmen in the marketplace. 13 '
V. The Elimination of Special Verdicts in Defamation Actions
Supporting the Actual Malice Standard

-

Insofar as the use of special verdicts undermines the constitutional protections afforded by the actual malice standard, the courts
should determine that the use of special verdicts in defamation cases
violates the protections of the first amendment. This is especially
127. See Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy - the Requirement of
Proof of Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1972), for the assertion
that general damages are inconsistent with the philosophy of the common law.
128. Anderson, supra note 80, at 479.
129. See Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
130. Id.
131. There is no reason why we should not make judgments of credibility in the realm of
personal attacks inasmuch as we do it all the time in the realm of private affairs. We are
constantly engaged in assessing the veracity of accusations among family, friends and co-workers. See F. HAIMAN, supra note 114, at 50.

true because the state's interest in effective and efficient judicial administration through use of special verdicts is insufficient to counterbalance impingement upon the first amendment.
Two arguments can be made from a procedural perspective for
retaining the special verdict. First, special verdicts simplify jury instructions, and second, they hold the jury to the three-prong test of
liability established in New York Times. Neither argument is forceful enough to warrant the continued use of special verdicts.
First, some have theorized that juries are confused by the complexity of instructions in defamation cases. 13 2 Even if this were true,

this notion must be balanced against what the Supreme Court has
found intolerable, that is, a chilling effect on the media brought
about by self-censorship. The proposition that juries may be confused by libel instructions, however, is highly speculative. In reality,
the jury is only asked to remember and resolve three rather straightforward questions: (1) Was the accusation defamatory, that is, did it
cause injury to the plaintiff's reputation? (2) Was the accusation
false? (3) Did the defendant make the accusation with knowledge
that it was false, or with reckless disregard for whether it was true?
Juries are frequently asked to resolve questions of this complexity
without the use of a special verdict. For example, in a murder case, a
jury might have to decide issues surrounding intent, premeditation,
duress, self-defense, mitigating and aggravating circumstances, all
with instruction from the court, and simply return a general verdict
of "guilty" or "not guilty." It is difficult to accept that a special
verdict is needed to protect the individual whose reputation is at
stake and not the individual whose life is at stake.
Second, it has been suggested that special verdicts be used to
hold the jury to the three-part New York Times test by requiring
them to answer the three questions outlined above.'33 This concept is
at odds with the traditional notion that the jury is allowed to reach
its decision behind closed doors. This tradition was illustrated in
Wilson v. Dyer, 3 4 in which the trial court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the jury return a special verdict. The court accepted
defense counsel's position that, "[i]t is nobody's business what the
jury do or why they do it."' 3 5 Thus, any state interest in holding the
jury to the proper test is minimal compared to the interest in protecting and promoting vigorous free speech with the actual malice
barrier.
132. See Franklin, supra note 89, at 8.
133. See Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 617 (1983).
134. 116 Vt. 342, 75 A.2d 677 (1950).
135. Id. at 346, 75 A.2d at 680.

Even if the special verdict is retained in defamation actions, the
court's unprecedented move in Sharon of having the jury announce
each finding as it was reached should not be followed. Such a procedure draws undue attention to the specific findings. It serves primarily to further vindication while inhibiting the function of the actual
malice standard. Because it exacerbates the problems already discussed, the individual announcement of findings should be checked
before it develops into a destructive trend.
VI.

Conclusion

The use of special verdicts undermines the actual malice standard by eroding protection the standard affords self-censorship. Any
state interest in using the special verdict as a tool of judicial administration, or in allowing plaintiffs vindication through a separate jury
declaration of falsehood, is outweighed by the need to discourage
self-censorship and to breed a climate ripe for free expression.
This unconstitutional erosion of the actual malice standard
should be checked. The use of special verdicts in defamation cases
must be abolished before media shy away from reporting the news as
they see it. In the Sharon case, the allegations proved false. Nonetheless, journalists occasionally receive information concerning serious official misconduct. The public should not be denied access to
that knowledge.
Syndi Leigh Norris

